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What motivates religious not-for-pro￿t health care providers? This paper uses
a change in ￿nancing of not-for-pro￿t health care providers in Uganda to test
two theories of organizational behavior. We show that ￿nancial aid leads to more
laboratory testing, lower user charges, and increased utilization. These ￿ndings
are consistent with the view that religious not-for-pro￿t providers are intrinsically
motivated to serve (poor) people and that these preferences matter quantitatively.
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Recent years have seen a rising involvement of non-governmental not-for-
pro￿t organizations in the delivery of foreign assistance (e.g. Edwards &
Hulme 1995, Hulme & Edwards 1997). Both international NGOs, as well as
bilateral and multilateral donors, increasingly have sought to channel devel-
opment funding through local not-for-pro￿t organizations (NFP). Underlying
this shift in delivery is the belief in the altruistic motivation of local NFP:s.
But is this presumption correct? Apart from a limited number of case studies,
there is little credible evidence on what motivates NFP:s in poor countries.
In this paper we exploit a change in ￿nancing of not-for-pro￿t health care
sector in Uganda to contrast two hypotheses of the motives of not-for-pro￿t
organizations: That workers and managers of NFP providers are intrinsically
motivated to serve (poor) people; or alternatively that NFP providers are
captured by their managers and/or workers and behave like for-pro￿t actors,
although they may not directly appropriate pro￿ts. Any surplus is thus used
to ￿nance perks for the management and/or sta⁄.1
We focus on the motives of one of the more important private actors,
at least in Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America: faith-based, or religious,
not-for-pro￿t organizations (RNFP).
To guide the empirical work, we start by studying the e⁄ects of ￿nancial
aid in a simple model of service provision. We show that price setting and
quality choice depend crucially on the assumption of the provider￿ s objectives.
A RNFP facility that cares about the number of (poor) people treated would
reduce user-fees and increase the quality of care in response to untied ￿nancial
aid, but aid would not a⁄ect a perquisite-maximizing not-for-pro￿t provider￿ s
choice of price and quality.
We use a change in ￿nancing of the not-for-pro￿t health care sector to dis-
tinguish between the aforementioned hypotheses.2 In ￿scal year 1999/2000,
the government of Uganda initiated a program in which every not-for-pro￿t
1Glaeser (2002) argues that weak board control may be just as important as di⁄erential
tax privileges, donations, and nondistribution constraint in explaining the behavior of not-
for-pro￿t ￿rms. Thus capture by managers is not speci￿c to not-for-pro￿ts in developing
countries, although it seems plausible that boards in the U.S. not-for-pro￿t sector have
better control those in the Ugandan primary health care sector (see discussion in section 2).
The capture argument is also related to the Pauly and Redisch￿ s (1973) view of hospitals
as physicians￿cooperatives.
2Duggan (2000) studies the di⁄ential response of not-for-pro￿t versus for-pro￿t hos-
pitals to a natural experiment induced by a government subsidy program. He examines
hospitals a⁄ected by California￿ s Disproportionate Share program and shows that the
behavior of not-for-pro￿t hospitals varies with the share of nearby hospitals organized
as for-pro￿t ￿rms: increased for-pro￿t penetration makes not-for-pro￿t hospitals more
pro￿t-oriented. The most common approach in the empirical literature on organizational
1primary health unit was to receive an untied grant. As this was a new and
unanticipated program, and due to poor communications from the govern-
ment￿ s part, some facilities did not receive their grant until the following
year. This de facto phasing-in of the aid program provides a source of vari-
ation that we can exploit to identify the objectives of RNFP providers. To
account for unobserved heterogeneity between early and late recipients, we
use a di⁄erence-in-di⁄erences approach, exploiting that fact that in ￿scal
year 2000/2001 and forward, all surveyed health units received the grant.
We ￿nd that ￿nancial aid leads to more testing of suspected malaria
cases, lower prices and increased utilization. Aid has no e⁄ect on remuner-
ation. The estimated e⁄ects are quantitatively important. These ￿ndings
are consistent with the view that religious not-for-pro￿t providers are in-
trinsically motivated to serve (poor) people - - working for God seems to
matter!
This paper is related to a large literature on the behavior of not-for-pro￿t
￿rms in the developed world, especially in the United States.3 Our work dif-
fers in several dimensions. First, we explicitly consider religious not-for-pro￿t
providers, rather than the more comprehensive notion of not-for-pro￿ts. Sec-
ond, we use quantitative survey data of di⁄erent aspects of service delivery
from a poor developing country. Third, as not-for-pro￿t health care providers
in Uganda are not regulated; have no obvious tax advantages over private
for-pro￿t ￿rms; and until the government grant program was initiated in
1999/2000, bene￿ted only marginally from donations or other ￿nancial sup-
port, we circumvent an important identi￿cation problem that has rendered
it di¢ cult to test altruistic models using U.S. data.4 Finally, we exploit a
behavior of the not-for-pro￿t sector is to compare not-for-pro￿t organizations in various
dimensions with other provides (private for-pro￿t and/or government providers), control-
ling for other confounding observable characteristics. A concern with such an approach is
that there may be unobserved (by the econometrician) quality di⁄erences across owners.
3The theoretical work has mainly evolved around three types of models; altruism mod-
els, which have quantity and quality of output in the ￿rm￿ s objective function; physician
cooperative models that are analogous to earlier cooperative ￿rm theories (Pauly and Re-
disch 1973); and non-contractible quality models, where for-pro￿t ￿rms have an incentive
to shirk on the quality of service to cut costs (for a review, see Malani, Philipson, and
David 2002; Lakdawalla and Philipson 2001). With respect to the U.S. health sector, the
empirical evidence is mixed (Malani, Philipson, and David 2002; McClellan and Staiger
2000; Philipson 2000; Rose-Ackerman 1996; Sloan and others 1998).
4The problem is that ownership type may be endogenous. A nonaltruistic entrepreneur
may choose a not-for-pro￿t status and locate in a poor neighborhood if she expects to
bene￿t, for example, from charitable donations as a consequence of this ownership/location
choice. Due to the absence of regulation and tax bene￿ts, and minimal donations, such
incentives should not play an important role in Uganda. Of course, the lack of regulation
and monitoring still raises the concern that preferences of the owner (say, a Catholic
2change in the ￿nancial incentives extended to the RNFP facilities to identify
the objectives of religious providers.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 brie￿ y describes
the institutional setting of health care in Uganda. Sections 3 presents a
simple model of behavior of the religious not-for-pro￿t health facility. In
section 4 we discuss identi￿cation and section 5 brie￿ y describes the survey
data. Section 6 presents the evidence and section 7 concludes.
2 Institutional setting
It is commonly held that Uganda had well-functioning health services in
the 1960s. Health care was provided free of charge, and access to care was
relatively good. Steady improvements were experienced in most health in-
dicators. However, as a result of the political and military turmoil of the
1970s and 1980s, the government de facto retreated from funding and pro-
viding public services. In health care the burden was taken up by the private
for-pro￿t sector and faith-based providers. Despite e⁄orts by the private for-
pro￿t and not-for-pro￿t sectors, health indicators fell dramatically (Republic
of Uganda 2001a).
Following restoration of peace in the late-1980s, the government imple-
mented a major program of health infrastructure rehabilitation in the public
sector in the 1990s. However, recurrent funding for health facilities remained
low (Jeppson 2001). As a result the quality of public services did not im-
prove at the same pace with health infrastructure, which is re￿ ected in the
continued high demand for privately provided care (Hutchinson 2001). Some
health indicators have improved, but others have not (Moeller 2002).
The modern health sector in Uganda has four types of facilities (hospitals,
health centers, dispensaries, and aid posts) and three types of actors (gov-
ernment, private for-pro￿t, and not-for-pro￿t). The health facility survey we
exploit in this paper has the dispensary as the unit of observation. Dispen-
saries are the most common health facilities in Uganda. Most dispensaries
are rural (89 percent).
According to the government health sector strategic plan, the standard
for dispensaries includes preventive, promotional, outpatient care, maternity,
general ward, and laboratory services (Republic of Uganda 2000). A dispen-
sary is suppose to have eight beds for inpatient care and to serve a population
of 20,000.
The census on the not-for-pro￿t health care sector in Uganda, carried out
in 2001, indicated that autonomous dioceses and parishes own 70 percent
of all private not-for-pro￿t health facilities, which total 450 lower-level units
parish) and the manager may di⁄er.
3and 42 hospitals (Republic of Uganda 2001b). The rest are owned by non-
governmental organizations (16 percent), some of which are also religious,
community-based organizations (6 percent), and by individuals (8 percent).
The census also shows that most not-for-pro￿t health facilities (82 percent)
are coordinated by one of three national umbrella organizations (Uganda
Protestant Medical Bureau, Uganda Catholic Medical Bureau, and Uganda
Muslim Supreme Council). In our sample, 86 percent of the facilities have
ties to one of these umbrella organizations.5
The ￿rst religious not-for-pro￿t health unit was established by mission-
aries in 1897 (Republic of Uganda 2001a). Thereafter local churches and
missionaries have set up hospital and health centers throughout the country.
At their departure, missionaries handed over the management to the local
church (diocese or parish). In the last three decades, as new parishes were es-
tablished, they routinely set up their own social services, particularly health
care. Typically, parishioners contributed to the investment cost, sometimes
aided by donations from the medical bureau or outside sources. The major-
ity of dispensaries owned by religious providers were built between 1960 and
1990. In our sample, the median year of establishment is 1983.
Not-for-pro￿t health care providers are self-governing. At the time of our
survey, there was no certi￿cation for not-for-pro￿t status (either by a medical
bureau or government). Hence, the manager in charge of the not-for-pro￿t
health unit together with the unit-speci￿c management committee were free
to decide on the mix and prices of services provided by the facility.
The importance of external donations have been declining. In our sample
of (religious) not-for-pro￿t facilities, only 3 out of 44 not-for-pro￿t dispen-
saries received donations from private sources and only 2 out of 44 facilities
received funds from the donor community in 1999/2000.6
In the 1960s, government grants were an important source of revenues
for the not-for-pro￿t sector. While public subsidies continued after indepen-
dence, over time the relations between religious providers and the government
deteriorated, as there was competition and a perceived di⁄erence in pay and
privileges (Republic of Uganda 2001a). In the 1970s and 1980s subsidies to
not-for-pro￿ts dwindled and eventually ceased altogether. The government
reinstated ￿nancial aid to hospitals in 1997. In ￿scal year 1999/2000, a new
program extended a similar subsidy to lower-level health units. The ￿nancial
5The remaining 14 % are run by Seventh Day Adventist.
6As stressed above, donations were more important in the 1970s and 1980s, as well as
at the start-up phase of a new health facility, when raising funds for construction. We
have some indirect evidence for the latter. Of the 29 not-for-pro￿t facilities that had
renovated their facility in the past, 14 had received ￿nancial support from private and/or
donor sources.
4aid program prescribed that every not-for-pro￿t unit was to receive a ￿xed-
amount grant for the ￿scal year. The amount of the grant varied according
to the level of the health facility. Each dispensary was to receive the same
amount, namely 2.5 million shillings ($US 1,400) a year. Each dispensary
with a maternity unit was to receive 3.4 million Ush ($US 1,900).
3 Conceptual framework
In this section we develop a simple model of not-for-pro￿t behavior and
study the e⁄ects of untied aid. The model is solved under two alternative
assumptions of the preferences of the not-for-pro￿t unit. The ￿rst set up
assumes the religious not-for-pro￿t facility is captured by a nonaltruistic
manager(s) (or that the owner has no altruistic concerns). The manager
may face a nondistribution constraint, in which case pro￿ts must be spent
on perquisites. The second set up instead assumes that the religious not-
for-pro￿t provider maximizes the total health impact of its activities, here
conceptualized as the number of patients treated.7
3.1 Basics
Consider the following simpli￿ed version of the model in Reinikka and Svens-
son (2004b). A manager for a not-for-pro￿t facility (NFP) j faces the problem
of determining the price and quality of a given health service. The inverse-
demand function is p = P(x;q) where p is the price, q is e⁄ort (quality),
Px < 0, Pq > 0 and Pxq > 0. Marginal cost is c(q), where cq > 0 and cqq > 0.
The facility is assumed to be a local monopolist.
3.2 The rent/pro￿t maximizing not-for-pro￿t facility
Total cash pro￿ts of facility j is ￿ = P(x;q)x￿c(q)x. Following Glaeser and
Shleifer (2001) we assume that if the nondistribution constraint binds, the
manager is forced to spend pro￿ts on perquisites, denoted by z. The utility
of spending pro￿ts on perquisites is v(z) = ￿z, where ￿ ￿ 1 is a constant.
If ￿ = 1,the manager￿ s problem is identical to that of a pro￿t-maximizing
￿rm.
The manager￿ s problem is to maximize
max
x;q ￿[P(x;q)x ￿ c(q)x] : (1)
7Clearly, conceptualizing altruism in the health sector with the number of patients
treated is not uncontroversial. See Malani, Philipson, and David (2002) for a review of
altruism models that typically have quantity (and/or quality) of output in the not-for-
pro￿t￿ s objective function.
53.3 The altruistic not-for-pro￿t facility
Consider next an altruistic not-for-pro￿t provider that maximizes the total
health impact of its activities. The total health impact could be de￿ned in a
variety of ways. Here we choose to operationalize it as the number of (poor)
patients treated. That is, the provider maximizes x, subject to the constraint
that P(x;q)x ￿ c(q)x ￿ 0.
3.4 The e⁄ects of ￿nancial aid
Consider the case of untied ￿nancial support a. The total cash pro￿ts of
facility i is then ￿ = P(x;q)x ￿ c(q)x + a. Since untied aid does not a⁄ect
the marginal cost or revenue schedules, for a rent/pro￿t maximizing provider
price setting and quality choice would be una⁄ected. That is, a rent/pro￿t
maximizing provider will set the same price and quality with and without
untied aid. Aid will only lead to increased rents, taking the form of higher
pro￿ts or more perks, depending on if the nondistribution constraint binds
or not.
The altruistic provider￿ s maximization program would, however, be af-
fected. Formally, with aid, the provider maximizes
max
x;q L = x + ￿(a + P(x;q)x ￿ c(q)x) : (2)
Solving the problem we can show (see Reinikka and Svensson, 2004b)
that for an altruistic provider, aid will lead to lower prices and to higher
quality care. These results are intuitive. The altruistic provider cares about
the number of (poor) people treated and this number can be increased by
either lowering prices or increasing the quality of care. Both strategies are
costly. Aid relaxes the provider￿ s budget constraint and at the margin it is
optimal to increase the number of people treated using both strategies.
To sum up, an altruistic provider will respond to the in￿ ow of untied aid
by lowering prices and increasing quality. As a result, more patients will be
treated. The price and quality choices of a rent/pro￿t maximizing provider
are una⁄ected by the in￿ ow of untied aid. These results form the basis for
the empirical test of the NFP sector.
4 Identi￿cation
The administrative design of the ￿nancial aid program involved three main
actors, the NFP facility, the district health administration, and the Ministry
of Finance (MoF). The ￿nancial aid program was under the authority of the
MoF. Based on the register of NFP facilities and requests made by the district
6health administrations, the MoF was assigned to determine and approve the
list of facilities entitled to funds. Once approved, funds were transferred to
the local governments (districts), which in turn distributed the funds to the
units concerned once the NFP facility￿ s request for ￿nancial support and its
workplan had been approved.
In theory, all NFP facilities should have received the funds in 1999/2000.
In practice, however, there was variation in receipts. This was in spite of
the fact that the umbrella organizations for not-for-pro￿t health providers
spent time and e⁄ort monitoring the program. In our sample of facilities, 37
percent of the NFP facilities did not receive their entitlement. Instead their
￿rst grant reached them the following ￿scal year. Thus, de facto the grant
program was phased in. It is this variation in receipts that we exploit to
estimate the behavior of the NFP facilities.
Anecdotal evidence suggest that the reason why not all facilities received
aid in 1999/2000 had to do with delays and administrative bottlenecks at
both the MoF and the district health administrations. If these delays and
administrative problems are idiosyncratic to the facilities, we could treat the
incidence of aid receipt as random and link receipt of aid to outcomes.
However, it is plausible that the incidence of receipts is correlated with
unobserved factors that may have an independent e⁄ect on outcomes. This
would be the case if well-connected units (for example units that the health
administration sta⁄ use and that may receive other types of support or are
supervised more closely) or well-managed units (for example units with man-
agers that can articulate its case to district o¢ cials) are more likely to be
treated expeditiously.8 Cross-sectional estimates will then produce biased
conclusions about the e⁄ects of the aid transfer. A bias would also occur if
the district administrations or the MoF made an e⁄ort to ￿rst provide aid
to the facilities in most need.9
Our approach to deal with this omitted variables problem is to exploit
the time dimension and the fact that in the following ￿scal year all sampled
facilities received the grant. If well-connected units, well-managed units, or
units in most need of support were also well-connected or poor in the year
8This is consistent with the ￿nding in Reinikka and Svensson (2004a). They study
the disbursements of grants across schools in Uganda and show that there are important
school-speci￿c e⁄ects that explain why some schools manage to claim their entitlments
while other do not. They also show that schools in better-o⁄ communities are more likely
to be able to claim funds from the center.
9This is consistent with the argument in Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1986). They show
that if the allocation of public resources across localities (e.g., health units) is systemati-
cally related to factors determining the outcome, and these factors are unobserved by the
researchers but known to the local provider, simple cross-sectional estimates will produce
misleading conclusions about the program e⁄ectiveness.
7following the intervention (￿nancial aid), we can estimate the causal e⁄ects
of aid through a di⁄erence-in-di⁄erence approach. Thus, we estimate
yjt = ￿0 + ￿1￿t + ￿2earlyj + ￿3earlyj￿t + xjt￿4 + "jt ; (3)
where yjt is outcome in health unit j at time t, ￿0 is a constant, ￿t is a
time dummy for ￿scal year 2000, early indicates whether the facility is a
treatment facility (i.e., start receiving the grant in 1999/2000), and x is a
vector of control variables that vary over time and across facilities. The
estimate of interest is ￿3.
A slightly more general speci￿cation allows for health unit ￿xed e⁄ects,
￿j:
yjt = ￿1￿t + ￿2earlyj￿t + xjt￿3 + ￿j + "jt ; (4)
In (4), we control for all unobserved ￿xed characacteristics that could be
correlated with grant receipt and outcomes. The estimate ￿2 is the e⁄ects
of untied aid. The key identi￿cation assumption is that after controlling for
unit ￿xed e⁄ects and time e⁄ects, the interaction between the ￿scal year
1999/2000 dummy and dummy indicating if the facility received aid the ￿rst
year is plausibly exogenous. The counterfactual assumption we make is thus
that if all NFP facilities would have received the funds the ￿rst year, yjt
would change at the same rate in the group of early and late receipients.
The exclusion restriction will fail if, for example, facilities di⁄er in the early
period and this di⁄erence is correlated with the likelihood of receiving aid
early. We turn to this in the next section.
Another concern with the ￿nancial aid experiment, which does not a⁄ect
identi￿cation of the e⁄ect of aid but interpretation, is that RNFP facilities
may be credit constrained. If that is the case, ￿nancial assistance, by relaxing
a binding credit constraint, may result in changed behavior also for a rent
or pro￿t maximizing provider. We do not believe this is a serious concern.
Foremost, as discussed below, we ￿nd no evidence of increased investment in
the group of early recipients. Second, the ￿nancial aid program was designed
to support not-for-pro￿t providers￿current expenditures (not for capital in-
vestment). Finally, to the extent that construction and/or procurement of
capital goods take time, this would tend to work against ￿nding an e⁄ect.
For example, if investments decisions in ￿scal year 2000 change the stock of
capital in 2001 and provided that the choice of prices and quality is a func-
tion of the capital stock, then since we compare outcomes in 2000 and 2002
and all facilities received aid in either 2000 or 2001, then both in 2000 and
in 2002 the group of facilities are similar.
5 Data
8The data that we use in this paper consists of two rounds of survey data from
44 randomly selected not-for-pro￿t facilities drawn from 10 randomly chosen
districts in Uganda (see appendix and Lindel￿w, Reinikka, and Svensson,
2003, for details).10 The sample is restricted to dispensaries and dispensaries
with maternity units in order to ensure a degree of homogeneity across facil-
ities. The full data set (155 health stations) include facilities from the three
main ownership categories: government, private not-for-pro￿t, and private
for-pro￿t. The subsample of nonpro￿ts we exploit here all have religious af-
￿liations. The sample was designed so that the proportion of facilities drawn
from di⁄erent regions and ownership categories broadly mirrors the popu-
lation of facilities. Of the 155 facilities, 81 (52%) are government owned,
44 (29%) are owned by not-for-pro￿t providers, and 30 (19%) are privately
owned.
10Three of these facilities did not have accurate data on grant receipt (or not) in ￿scal
year 2000. We drop one facility from the sample due to incompleteness and inconsisten-
cies in the reported data. As an additional ￿ltering rule for the di⁄erence-in-di⁄erences
analysis, we require facilities to have information on outcomes (yjdt) for both years to be
included in the sample.
96 Evidence
In order to interpret estimates of ￿3 (oe ￿2) in (3) (in (4)) as evidence in
favor (or not) of the "altruistic" model, it is important to rule out the al-
ternative explanations of pre-grant di⁄erences across units (correletaed with
the liklihood of early grant receipts) or binding credit constraints.
We do not have data on investments. However, we have data on equip-
ment (number of) and the working area (in square meters) of the facility at
the end of the ￿scal year2000. If ￿nancial assistance relaxed a binding credit
constraint and thereby increased investment, presumably the group of early
recipients would di⁄er in available infrastructure at the end of the year. In
Table 1 we report average values for a set of important inputs for both types
of facilities (columns 2 and 3). The fourth column reports the F-statistic of
the null hypothesis that the average values are equal. We cannot reject the
joint hypothesis that the early and late grant recipients have, on average,
the same number of examination beds, sterilization equipment, refrigeration
equipment, blood pressure equipment, microscopes, sets of protective cloth-
ing, weighting scales, height measurement and working area.11 Looking at
the individual inputs, only the number of weighting scales is signi￿cantly dif-
ferent between the two groups. These ￿ndings are di¢ cult to reconcile with
a credit constraint story.
We next turn to the question if the early grant recipients (treatment
group) is systematically di⁄erent (on observables) from the group of late re-
cipients (control group). Table 2 reports average values for a set of observable
characteristics for both types of facilities. Row 2 shows that the treatment
and control group do not di⁄er signi￿cantly in age; i.e., the year the facility
was established. The treatment and control groups are similar with respect
to access to communication infrastructure (rows 3-5); i.e., a late recipient is
as likely as an early recipient to have access to telephone, newspapers, and
radio at the facility. The two group of facilities are also indistinguishable
with respect to source of water supply (if the main source is piped water,
borehole, or protected spring) and electricity.12 We also do not ￿nd any
signi￿cant di⁄erences in distance to district or health sub-district headquar-
ters (rows 7-8). Thus, there is no (observable) evidence suggesting that the
treatment and control groups di⁄er on observable characteristics.
In order to assess the e⁄ects of ￿nancial aid one must identify which
potential variables might be a⁄ected by the in￿ ow of money in a short time
11The Wald statistic for testing the null hypothesis that all averages (of the n variables
listed in table 1) across early and late recipients are equal is distributed as ￿2(n). The
test statistic is 8.50 with p-value of 0.49.
12All NGO facilities were either connected to the grid or had their own generator.
10interval (no longer than a year). We look at three sets of variables that the
facilities can easily adjust in the short run: testing procedures (as a proxy
for quality), prices, and sta⁄ remuneration.
One important component in prescribing the correct treatment for malaria
and intestinal worm cases is laboratory testing. We have information on the
number of malaria blood slides carried out (for every 100 outpatient), and
the number of stool tests undertaken (for every 100 outpatient).13
Table 3 depicts the adjusted di⁄erence-in-di⁄erence estimates on the num-
ber of malaria blood slides. In columns 1-2, we report simple cross-section
estimates for ￿scal year 2000 (treatment year) and 2002. Early grant receip-
ients test signi￿ciantly more patients for malaria in ￿scal year 2000, while
there is no di⁄erence in the extent of testing in 2002. The di⁄erence-in-
di⁄erences estimates is reported in column 3. In column 4, we add a set
of time-varying controls and in column 5 we also allow for health-unit ￿xed
e⁄ects. The treatment e⁄ect (￿3 [￿2]) is signi￿cant in all three speci￿cations
and ranges from 12.7-14.0 additional patients tested. This is a large e⁄ect,
although it is worth emphasising that the 90 percent con￿dence interval of
our estimate goes from 1.5 to 24.5 percent. As a point of reference, the con-
trol group tested on average 5.7 percent of the patients visiting the clinics in
2000.
The adjusted di⁄erence-in-di⁄erence estimates on the number of stool-
tests for every 100 suspected intestinal worm cases are reported in Table
4. Early grant receipients performed signi￿ciantly more stool tests in ￿scal
year 2000 but just as many as the control group in 2002. The di⁄erence-in-
di⁄erences estimates are positive (columns 3-5) but imprecisely estimated.
In the model, a provider with preferences de￿ned over the number of
(poor) people treated would not only improve quality but also cut prices
in response to untied ￿nancial assistance. We turn next to assessing this
prediction. Table 5 reports the ￿ndings on user-fee of general outpatient
service (OPD). The ￿rst two columns in table 5 report the cross-section
estimates. In ￿scal year 2000, the early grant receipients charged signi￿cantly
less. The di⁄erences-in-di⁄erences estimates (￿3 [￿2]) range from -1,292 to
-1,346 and is signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero at the 5 percent level in all
three speci￿cations. Again, this is an economically large e⁄ect considering
that in 2000 the late-recipients charged on average 2,480 Ush per visit (with
a one-standard deviation equal to 1,759 Ush).
The price cut is also associated with an increase in patient numbers (ta-
13Data on number of patients were collected from daily patient records. That is, enu-
merators calculated the number of patients visiting the clinic for a set of months. Number
of malaria test are collected from daily laboratory records.
11ble 6). The di⁄erence-in-di⁄erences estimates, however, are imprecisely esti-
mated.
An altruistic provider will respond to the in￿ ow of untied aid by lowering
prices and increasing quality while a rent-maximizing facility with a binding
nondistribution constraint would spend aid on perquisites and wages. The
last set of regressions look at this prediction. The dependent variable in Table
7 is the full-time equivalent salary plus lunch allowances per month. Because
sta⁄composition may di⁄er across units, we estimate four regressions, one for
the average salary of all sta⁄(column 1); one for the average salary of highly
quali￿ed sta⁄(column 2); one for the average salary of quali￿ed sta⁄(column
3); and one for nursing aides (column 4).14 We ￿nd no robust evidence of a
relationship between grant receipt and sta⁄ remuneration.15
Are the e⁄ects reported in table 3 - 8 quantitatively important? While it
is di¢ cult to provide a ￿rm answer, a back-of-the-envelope calculation shows
that the sum of the foregone revenues of the price cut and the increased
cost of testing for malaria and intestinal worms account for approximately
62 percent of the grant for the median facility.16 In other words, a large share
of the grant can be accounted for by the foregone revenues of the price cut
and the increased cost of laboratory testing.
6.1 Robustness tests
Administrative bottlenecks at the Ministry of Finance and the district
health administrations, rather the health unit speci￿c characteristics, caused
the dealys in grant disbursements. Thus, there are reasons to believe that,
controlling for unit ￿xed e⁄ects and time e⁄ects, the interaction between
the starting year of the grant program and indicator variable for early grant
receipt will re￿ ect factors outside the health unit￿ s control. One concern is
that the administrative bottlenecks not only a⁄ected the implementation of
the grant program but adversly, and systematically, in￿ uenced the function of
the various other ￿nacial and in-kind support program for health providers.
Table 8 report a set of placebo tests on these other support programs.
We have data on whether the health unit received vaccines during the year
14High quali￿ed sta⁄ include medical doctor, and clinical o¢ cer (A level and three years
of medical training). Quali￿ed sta⁄ include comprehensive nurse (A level and three years
of medical training), registered nurse (A level and two-and-half years of medical training),
laboratory assistant (O level and three years of medical training), and enrolled nurse and
midwife (O level and two-and-half years of medical training).
15Early grant receipt is uncorrelated with the di⁄erent measures of remuneration also
in the cross-section speci￿cations and when controlling for health unit ￿xed e⁄ects.
16The calculation is based on the assumption that the grant was received with no delay
and a cost (including wage costs) of one dollar per test.
12for which it did not pay or whether it received free drug supplies. We also
have detailed data the number of doses (tablets) of Chloroquine and Septrin
received for free during the year. Table 8 decpits the di⁄erence-in-di⁄erences
estimates on these four variables. As evident, the treatment e⁄ect (￿2) is
insini￿cant in all four speci￿cations. Thus, the implementation of the other
main support programs (which have been in place for several years) do not
follow the same pattern as the grant program considered here.
7 Conclusion
What motivates religious not-for-pro￿t health care providers? This paper
uses a change in ￿nancing of not-for-pro￿t health care providers in Uganda
to test two theories of organizational behavior. We show that ￿nancial aid
leads to more laboratory testing, lower user charges and increased utilization,
but we ￿nd no correlation between aid and remuneration. These ￿ndings are
consistent with the view that religious not-for-pro￿t providers are intrinsi-
cally motivated to serve (poor) people. A number of speci￿cation checks
support the causal interpretation of these estimates.
This paper is only a ￿rst attempt to evaluate religious not-for-pro￿t
provider. Since all not-for-pro￿t providers in our sample have religious a¢ l-
iations, future research should further explore the objective to serve (poor)
people is driven by some deeper motivation to convert people. Distinguish-
ing between these two objectives would require data also on nonreligious
providers and a theory of conversion. We believe that this is an important
area for future research.
13A Appendix
A.1 Data
Tools to collect data and analyze service provider behavior include facility modules
in household surveys and empirical studies to estimate facility cost functions. The
approach used here, a quantitative service delivery survey (QSDS), is distinct from
these other tools in a number of respects (Dehn, Reinikka, and Svensson 2003).
A QSDS is similar to a ￿rm-level survey. The key di⁄erence is that it explicitly
recognizes that agents in the service delivery system may have a strong incentive
to misreport (or not report) key data. To this end, data are obtained directly
from the records kept by facilities for their own need (i.e. daily patient registers,
stock cards, etc.) rather than from administrative records submitted to the local
government. The former, often available in a highly disaggregate format, are
considered to su⁄er the least from any incentive problems in record-keeping.
A.2 Sample
The sample design was governed by three principles (see Lindel￿w, Reinikka, and
Svensson, 2003, for details). First, attention was restricted to dispensaries and dis-
pensaries with maternity units to ensure a degree of homogeneity across sampled
facilities. Second, subject to security constraints, the sample captured regional
di⁄erences. Finally, the sample included facilities from the main ownership cate-
gories: government, private not-for-pro￿t and private for-pro￿t providers.
These three considerations lead to a strati￿ed random sample. The sample
was based on the Ministry of Health (MoH) facility register for 1999. The register
includes government, private not-for-pro￿t, and private for-pro￿t facilities. A total
of 155 health facilities were surveyed. On the basis of existing information, it was
decided that the sample would include 81 government facilities, 44 private non-
for-pro￿t facilities, and 30 private for-pro￿t facilities.
As a ￿rst step in the sampling process, 8 districts (out of 45) had to be dropped
from the sample frame due to security concerns. From the remaining districts, 10
districts, strati￿ed according to geographical location, were randomly sampled in
proportion to district population size. Thus, three districts were chosen from the
Eastern and Central regions and two from the Western and Northern regions.17
From the selected districts, a sample of government and private nonpro￿t fa-
cilities was drawn randomly from the MoH register.
The ￿eld work for the ￿rst round was carried out during October to December
2000. The second round of data collection was carried out in 2004. Data was
collected for 2003, although for some variables information was also collected for
2001 and 2002.
17The study districts were Mpigi, Mukono and Masaka in the Central region; Mbale,
Iganga and Soroti in the East; Arua and Apac in the North; and Mbarara and Bushenyi
in the West.
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16Table 1. Infrastructure (investment) of early and late grant recipients at the end of 2000 
Variable Early  recipient  Late  recipient F-test  (early=late) 
Examination beds  1.54  1.64  0.08 
[.78] 
Sterilization equipment  2.77  2.21  1.27 
[.27] 
Refrigeration equipment  0.65  0.71  0.12 
[.73] 
Blood pressure equipment  1.31  1.07  0.79 
[.38] 
Microscopes 0.81  0.57  1.29 
[.26] 
Sets of protective clothing  1.50  1.07  0.54 
[.47] 
Weighting scales  2.54  1.5  6.51 
[.02] 
Height scales  0.24  0.07  1.58 
[.22] 
Working area (square 
meters) 
314 242  1.35 
[.25] 
Notes: (i) Mean values in columns (2) and (3). (ii) F-statistic of the null hypothesis that the average values 
are equal with P-values in brackets in column (4). Number of observations is 40. 
 Table 2. Characteristics of early and late grant recipients 
Variable  Early recipient  Late recipient  F-test 
(early=late) 
Established (year)  1978  1981  0.35 
[.56] 
Access to telephone  0.04  0.00  0.53 
[.47] 
Access to newspaper  0.23  0.21  0.01 
[.91] 
Access to radio  0.58  0.64  0.05 
[.83] 
Access to safe water supply  0.69  0.79  0.38 
[.54] 
Distance to district HQ (km)  27.3  29.6  0.07 
[.80] 
Distance to health sub-district 
HQ (km) 
12.2 9.5 0.63 
[.43] 
Notes: (i) Mean values in columns (2) and (3). (ii) F-statistic of the null hypothesis that the average values 
are equal with P-values in brackets in column (4). Number of observations is 44. Table 3.  Adjusted difference-in-difference estimates of early and late grant receipt on 
number of   blood slides for every 100 outpatient 
Regression (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 








































Controls No  No  No  Yes  Yes 













Facilities 39  42  81  80  80 
Robust standard errors in parenthesis. * (**) [***] denotes significance at the 10 (5) [1] percent level. 
Time varying controls are the number of dispensaries and health centers in the facility's catchment area; 
number of weighting scales; and number of staff. 
 
 Table 4.  Adjusted difference-in-difference estimates of early and late grant receipt on 
number of stool tests undertaken for every 100 outpatient 
Regression (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 



































Controls No  No  No  Yes  Yes 













Facilities 40  29  69  69  69 
Robust standard errors in parenthesis. * (**) [***] denotes significance at the 10 (5) [1] percent level. 
Time varying controls are the number of dispensaries and health centers in the facility's catchment area; 
number of weighting scales; and number of staff. 
 Table 5. Adjusted difference-in-difference estimates of early and late grant receipt on 
user-fee of general outpatient service  
Regression (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 










































Controls No  No  No  Yes  Yes 













Facilities 35  38  73  73  73 
Robust standard errors in parenthesis. * (**) [***] denotes significance at the 10 (5) [1] percent level. 
Time varying controls are the number of dispensaries and health centers in the facility's catchment area; 
number of weighting scales; and number of staff. 
 
 Table 6. Adjusted difference-in-difference estimates of early and late grant receipt on 
utilization (log of outpatients per month) service  
Regression (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 







































Controls No  No  No  Yes  Yes 













Facilities 39  42  81  79  79 
Robust standard errors in parenthesis. * (**) [***] denotes significance at the 10 (5) [1] percent level. 
Time varying controls are the number of dispensaries and health centers in the facility's catchment area; 
number of weighting scales; and number of staff. 
 Table 7. Adjusted difference-in-difference estimates of early and late grant 
receipt on remuneration 
Regression (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 











































Controls Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
R
2 0.21  0.31  0.25  0.18 
Facilities 69  28  60  60 
Robust standard errors in parenthesis. * (**) [***] denotes significance at the 10 (5) [1] percent level. 
Time varying controls are the number of dispensaries and health centers in the facility's catchment area; 
number of weighting scales; and number of staff. Table 8.  Placebo tests: Supply of drugs and vaccines  
Regression (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Years ALL  ALL  ALL  ALL 
Dependent variable  Vaccines Drug 
supplies
Chloroquine Septrin 




















Controls Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 











Facilities 39  42  81  78 
Robust standard errors in parenthesis. * (**) [***] denotes significance at the 10 (5) [1] 
percent level. Time varying controls are the number of dispensaries and health centers in the 
facility's catchment area; number of weighting scales; and number of staff. 
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